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ABSTRACT
Symbolic Versus Sustainable: Tracking the Apparel Industry’s
Response to Crisis Over Time

by

Sadelle R. Crabb, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017

Major Professor: Christy Glass
Department: Sociology

In this study I investigate the impact different director types have on firm
commitments to voluntary labor regulation. Using an author-constructed dataset of eight
focal firm’s boards of directors for a nineteen-year period, I examine the impacts of
gender and racial diversity, as well as the inclusion of independent interlocking board
members on firm commitments to voluntary labor regulation following a legitimacy crisis
in the 1990s. Framing firms’ responses within a chronological approach to institutional
theory, I test how trends for these three director types varied for firms most and least
committed to voluntary labor regulation, as well as for firms that underwent bankruptcy,
an acquisition, or split into various firms between 1996 and 2014. Findings suggest that
firms view gender and racial diversity in similar ways, but independent interlocks as a
separate strategy. All firms increased the number of women and racial minorities on their
boards, with least committed firms having the highest percentages of both over this entire
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period. Use of independent interlocks increased at a moderate rate for most committed
firms, decreased over time for least committed firms, and increased significantly for firms
going through additional crises (bankruptcy, an acquisition, or splitting up). This study
contributes to theory and research on organizational change by extending understanding
of mechanisms that drive organizational change in response to crisis by analyzing internal
normative mechanisms that shaped firms’ responses. It extends research on board
composition by analyzing the conditions under which board diversity and interlocked
board members are sought by focal firms. Understanding how and why board diversity
and independent interlock membership serve as mechanisms of internal, normative
change provides insight into what internal mechanisms shape organizational policies and
practices, and provide a correction to the over-focus on external, coercive mechanisms in
existing scholarship.

(65 pages)
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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s, the apparel and footwear industry faced a legitimacy crisis
stemming from intense public backlash for their labor practices in global supply chains.
Concerns over sweatshop production abroad included issues of unsafe working
conditions, provision of extremely low wages, as well as employing very young workers
(Spar 2002). This was a period of strong political organizing against the industry, and
aggressive campaigns were launched by labor groups, NGOs, and student groups such as
“Students Against Sweatshops.” These efforts aimed to raise public awareness of harmful
corporate practices in relation to labor rights in global manufacturing (USAC &
Featherstone 2002; Gereffi et al. 2001).
Following intense media attention and subsequent public outcry, President
Clinton called for a Presidential taskforce to study the issue, and called leaders in the
apparel and footwear industry to meet with representatives of NGOs, unions, and the US
Department of Labor. When industry leaders met with labor activists alongside President
Clinton in 1996, they formed the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). The AIP crafted a
code of conduct to guide industry labor practices, and subsequently established the Fair
Labor Association (FLA) in 1999 to implement and monitor this code (Gereffi et al.
2001, Hemphill 1999). Thus, these founding firms voluntarily agreed upon constructing a
shared labor standard for the industry (crafted by the AIP) as well as to voluntary
regulation of labor practices (monitored by the FLA). These voluntary actions reflected a
collective attempt to overcome this legitimacy crisis in the short term.
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Since the formation of the FLA, much scholarship has analyzed the efficacy of the
FLA’s (and similar voluntary regulatory organizations’) certification strategies—
specifically, the monitoring standards for implementation of the codes of conduct (Pruett
et al. 2005; Emmelhainz & Adam 1999; O’Rourke 2003; Conner & Dent 2006;
Distelhorst et al. 2015a; Distelhorst et al. 2015b; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke et al. 2007b).
While many scholars have critiqued the efficacy of voluntary regulation in general,
scholars have also sought to distinguish supply chain management efforts that seek to
transform and sustain best practices from those aimed merely at symbolically addressing
activist concerns (Weaver et al. 1999; MacLean & Behnam 2010; Seuring and Mueller
2010).
Most scholarship on the evolution of global labor standards in the apparel industry
has focused on external pressures (such as political organizing) as the primary
mechanism driving organizational change in the industry (e.g., Spar 2002; Emmelhainz &
Adams 1999; Seuring & Mueller 2008). Much less scholarly attention has focused on the
internal pressures and mechanisms that shaped corporate policies and practices in
response to the crisis. Recent scholarship provides mounting evidence that internal
changes to firms’ governance—namely, increased diversity on the board of directors
and/or the appointment of independent interlocked board directors—are associated with
stronger efforts to achieve corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes (Fondas &
Sassalos 2000; Brown et al. 2002; Hillman et al. 2002; Bear et al. 2010; Glass et al.
2015). However, there is a lack of scholarship concerning the conditions that motivate
organizations to seek more diverse board members (women and/or racial minorities)
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and/or independent interlocked directors and the mechanisms by which such leaders
facilitate organizational change.
This study fills that gap by analyzing how the current system of voluntary
regulation was established, and testing whether or not the development of this system in
the short, medium, and long terms was (at least in part) the result of specific and
deliberate internal changes to the composition of focal firms’ boards of directors (BODs).
Specifically, this study asks: did firms respond to the legitimacy crisis in the 1990s by
seeking to alter the composition of their boards of directors, either through the
appointment of women and minority directors and/or through the appointment of
independent interlocked directors? And was this adaptive strategy sustained over time
through the short, mid, and long term periods?
Positioning the increased BOD diversity and CSR outcomes research within the
symbolic versus sustainable labor governance debate, I hypothesize that firms that have
maintained their commitment to voluntary labor monitoring to the present day
(representing firms attempting to transform and sustain best practices) will have pursued
changes to BOD compositions towards the inclusion of more independent interlocked
board members and/or more women/racial minorities serving as board members over
time. Conversely, I hypothesize that firms whose commitments to voluntary labor
monitoring have dissolved by the present day (representing firms whose changes are of a
more symbolic nature) will exhibit inclusion of more diverse board members in the short
run, but will have returned to more of a “business as usual” board composition, featuring
mostly white men, for the medium and long terms.
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By answering these questions, this study advances the literature in three ways.
First, it extends our understanding of mechanisms that drive organizational change in
response to crisis by analyzing internal normative mechanisms that shaped firms’
responses. Second, it extends research on board composition by analyzing the conditions
under which board diversity and interlocked board members are sought by focal firms.
Thirdly, understanding how and why board diversity and independent interlock
membership serve as mechanisms of internal, normative change will provide insight into
what internal mechanisms shape organizational policies and practices, and provide a
correction to the over-focus on external, coercive mechanisms in existing scholarship.
Lastly, findings relating firms going through additional crises with drastically increased
use of independent interlocks provides new avenue for research.
I begin in the next section by reviewing how the current system of voluntary
regulation of global labor practices was established. Next, I situate the relevant literature
within the framework of a chronological approach to institutional theory, and distinguish
between the different mechanisms institutional theory provides that contribute to
organizational change: coercive, mimetic, and normative. I then introduce my deductive,
explanatory trend analysis of how many independent interlocking and/or female and
racial minority directors were on focal boards in the short, mid, and long terms between
1996-2014. Subsequently, in the findings I demonstrate that both the least and most
committed firm groups pursued a strategy to appoint more female directors, more racial
minority directors, and more independent interlocking directors to their boards over this
period. However, the group of firms least committed to voluntary labor regulation had the
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highest percentages of directors in each of these categories over this entire period (19962014), contrary to the hypothesized relationships. Finally, I discuss the theoretical
implications of this BOD management strategy for scholars discussing sustainable supply
chain management, as well as the implications it may have for both theory and practice
related to global labor governance practices now and in the future.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The History of Labor Regulation in the Global Apparel Industry
By the 1990s, globalization of the apparel industry (similar to other secondary
labor sector industries such as manufacturing) had resulted in the geographical dispersion
of the production process. This global division of labor often spanned several countries
throughout the process and was characterized by brand’s dealing with various contracted
and subcontracted suppliers. The global division of labor incentivized retailers and brands
to push the risks of production associated with demands for cheaper apparel items further
down the division of labor pipeline towards the contractors and subcontractors.
Stemming from these increased pressures on contractors and subcontractors in the
global production process, reports of labor abuses gained critical media attention in the
early to mid-1990s. Much of this critical media attention was directed at Nike, who was a
visible industry leader during this period. As early as 1992, Nike was the primary target
of labor activist and sweatshop critic Jeff Ballinger, who ran the AAFLI office in
Indonesia where Nike had numerous operations (Spar 2002). In the August 1992 issue of
Harper’s magazine, Ballinger published a comparison of a typical Nike paystub from an
Indonesian factory and Michael Jordan’s Nike endorsement contract. This comparison
reported that it would take an Indonesian worker 44,492 years to make the equivalent pay
of Jordan’s endorsement contract, sparking outrage among American consumers (Spar
2002). Over the next few years other media outlets soon followed suit in posting articles
critical of Nike’s global labor practices including Nike’s hometown newspaper: the
Portland Oregonian, Life magazine, and editorials in Business Week (Spar 2002).
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Additionally, some scholars viewed the role of Charles Kernaghan—executive
director of the National Labor Committee—as pivotal in bringing media attention to the
apparel industry’s labor issues. Kernaghan testified before Congress on April 29, 1996
about the garment manufacturing of the Kathy Lee Gifford label, retailed by Wal-Mart.
He revealed that Honduran girls as young as 13 years old were working under armed
guard for approximately 31 cents per hour (Hemphill 1999). Responding to the media
attention on Nike, Kernaghan’s Congressional testimony, and the subsequent public
outrage, President Clinton called for a Presidential taskforce to study the issue, and called
leaders in the apparel and footwear industry—including Nike and Kathy Lee Gifford—to
meet with labor activists. These industry representatives met with President Clinton and
labor activists in 1996 and formed the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) with 18
original corporate members (Hemphill 1999). The AIP issued a report to President
Clinton on April 14, 1997 containing agreed-upon “Workplace Code of Conduct” and
“Principles of Monitoring” documents that were to be included in a formal “Partnership
Agreement” (Hemphill 1999).
Following this agreement, members of the AIP committed to form an association
to enforce these new standards in the following 6 months. However, further progress on
the Partnership Agreement was grid-locked throughout 1998, due to the failure of
member firms to comply with the demands of the labor activists for the inclusion of a
provision of a “living wage” to be paid to workers, restrictions for operating in countries
that repress unions, and for a higher percentage of manufacturing facilities to be
externally monitored annually (Hemphill 1999). From this gridlock, nine of the original
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eighteen members continued to meet throughout 1998 and eventually provided the
Clinton Administration with a finished Partnership Agreement on November 3, 1998.
The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was formed from the final AIP members, and with the
intention of facilitating the voluntary implementation of the “Workplace Code of
Conduct” and “Principles of Monitoring” of the Partnership Agreement in the production
facilities of member firms (Hemphill 1999).
The primary function of the FLA and other regulatory organizations is to assess
production facilities through scheduled audits (Hemphill 1999). The regulatory
organizations essentially assess the implementation of the codes of conduct and on-site
interviews with facility employees; they then certify firms based on their results and
provide publicly accessible reports of their findings. Since the formation of the FLA in
1999, this voluntary regulation has been the dominant model used to monitor labor
standards in facilities around the world and still is today. Although it started in the
apparel and footwear industry exclusively, these organizations have since branched out
into serving industries “from agriculture and technology to apparel and footwear” (Fair
Labor Association 2016). The FLA’s most notable entrance into the tech industry was in
2012, when Apple joined their ranks as a member company and opened their notorious
Foxconn factory facilities in China to FLA inspection. Today the FLA has over 40
member firms, several representatives of civil society organizations, and university
representatives; however, no union representation.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Originally formulated to explain how organizations respond to uncertainty,
DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism provides a range of
mechanisms that contribute to organizational change. “Isomorphism” refers to
constraining forces that make units within a given environment more similar to one
another through simultaneous pressures. In the case of institutional isomorphism, these
units are organizations. This concept is especially valuable when considering ways in
which—aside from economic competition—organizations interact and affect one another:
“organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and
institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio & Powell
1983, 150). Thus, this theoretical perspective is particularly relevant to understanding
organizational responses to an exogenous crisis such as that facing the apparel industry in
the 1990s.
Chronological Approach to Institutional Theory
This study applies the framework of institutional theory to the legitimacy crisis
experienced by focal firms in the 1990’s with a unique approach: considering the
isomorphic forces—coercive, mimetic, and normative—as shaping organizations in a
chronological sequence rather than simultaneously. Specifically, this study considers the
internal, normative organizational changes to corporate policies and practices that were
triggered by the external, coercive forces of this legitimacy crisis. This chronological
framework is applied to the apparel industry as a whole at the macro level.
This chronological approach to institutional theory is based in part on the model
developed by Seuring and Mueller (2010), describing “triggers for sustainable supply
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chain management” (1703). In their model, external pressures and incentives from
multiple groups (government, customers, and other stakeholders) are the initial “trigger”
that pushes firms towards adopting more sustainable supply chain practices. Following
these pressures, Seuring and Mueller note that firms “usually pass the pressure on to
suppliers” through mechanisms such as codes of conduct (1703). More generally, Seuring
and Mueller categorize firms’ responses to increased pressures in one of two ways:
“supplier management for risks and performance”, more symbolic in nature, and “supply
chain management for sustainable products”, more sustainable and focused on long-term
transformation of supply chain management practices (1703).
Organizational Change: Symbolic or Sustainable?
In “supplier management for risks and performance”, the firm’s priority is
centered-around reputation maintenance; their response under this strategy is to
implement additional environmental and social criteria for evaluating their suppliers. This
model is consistent with the actions of the member firms of the FLA because they opted
to enforce codes of conduct in their suppliers’ production facilities. The second strategy,
“supply chain management for sustainable products”, addresses the environmental and
social impacts of products throughout the entire lifecycle—therefore, implementing
standards throughout the supply chain is only one part of this more comprehensive
strategy. Seuring and Mueller describe “sustainable products” as: “all kinds of products
that have or aim at an improved environmental and social quality, which can be related
back to the…implementation of environmental and social standards” (1705). This
distinction between more sustainable responses (commitments to true transformation in
the production process) and responses focused on risk management (more symbolic in
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nature) informs the framework’s meso-level distinction between “symbolic” and
“sustainable” commitments to changing their labor governance practices. The full
theoretical framework is provided on the following page in Figure 1.
Institutional Theory and Organizational Change
Institutional theory is effective in analyzing the legitimacy crisis faced by the
apparel and footwear industry in the 1990s because it specifically discusses the means by
which organizations pursue change in order to secure legitimacy among various
stakeholders in the environment. The theory posits that, at some point, organizations
make changes aiming beyond increasing efficiency, and towards increasing legitimacy:
“As an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides
legitimacy rather than improves performance” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:148).
The transition apparel firms made over the past 20 years epitomizes this
sentiment: leaving behind practices of sweatshop labor, though economically efficient,
and aiming towards improved labor governance strategies, to maintain legitimacy.
According to the theory, three types of pressures motivate firms to alter practices and
policies: coercive, mimetic and normative. Each of these pressures influence firms to
adopt strategies that improve the performance of the firm but also advance the legitimacy
of the firm’s practices in the eyes of various stakeholders. I review each of these
mechanisms below before turning to the focal mechanisms of this study.
Coercive pressures:
Coercive pressures can be understood as external pressures that come from
political influence and the issue of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). They include
formal mandates by the government or by other organizations they are dependent upon,
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but they also include cultural expectations from the broader environment in which the
organization operates within, such as consumers or competing firms. Thus, the
social/political backlash and pressures exerted by formal and informal external sources in
the 1990s—such as the US government, consumers, the media, and other politically
organized groups—can be seen as coercive pressures. Additionally, actions taken by
competing firms can be externally constraining and considered coercive. For example,
when firms started to outsource production to Asian countries, this significantly
decreased the costs of production so they could lower prices. In order to compete, other
firms followed suit and also outsourced production to cut costs and maintain competitive
price levels—thus, to remain competitive, they were coerced to take these actions by the
external actions of their competitor firms.
Scholarly focus since the formation of the FLA and other private third-party labor
auditing organizations has primarily been on testing the efficacy of social auditing
programs, codes of conduct, etc. For example, Pruett et al. (2005) details the emergence
of social auditing to check working conditions for several companies in the mid-1990s,
including Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, and C&A. They conclude their overview with a
critique that these social auditing efforts were “weak” and in need of help from
independent, civil society organizations. This critique is similar to those waged by
Emmelhainz & Adam (1999), who studied the new industry initiatives and corporate
codes of conduct of the mid-1990s. They found that although many firms did have codes
of conduct, they lacked uniformity across the industry, there was a major lack of detail
within the codes, and they were overall too lenient in the area of monitoring and
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enforcement. Looking at the new nongovernmental systems for advancing labor
standards that had surfaced between 1998 and 2003 (including the FLA), O’Rourke
(2003) concluded that these organizations needed new mechanisms for accountability to
workers, greater transparency, and improved technical capacity.
Alternatively, the reactions of the business community to the legitimacy crisis
aimed to soothe investors’ concerns. Rivoli (2003) compared the changing expectations
for humane labor practices to the industrial revolution, and suggested there would
eventually be a compromise that would appease critics but still allow firms to make a
reasonable profit (and thus still provide adequate shareholder returns).
Mimetic pressures:
Mimetic changes reflect efforts by organizations to seek legitimacy by modeling
their behavior on that of other organizations in their field, and firms’ responses to
mimetic pressures have been documented in previous literature (Galaskiewicz and
Wasserman 1989; Haveman 1993; Kraatz 1998). Organizational mimicking is evident in
the case of the apparel and footwear industry’s transition since the late 1990s. During that
time, several smaller firms have joined the FLA. Today, over 40 firms belong to the
organization (Fair Labor Association 2016). Additionally, other external regulatory
organizations have formed, including the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), founded
in 2009 by Wal-Mart and Patagonia and the Better Work program, founded in 2007,
which represents a partnership between the UN’s International Labor Organization (ILO)
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC),. The SAC includes over 160 members
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from academia, brands, foundations, nonprofits, retailers and other sectors, and the Better
Work program works with private enterprises in about 100 countries.
Although mimetic pressures are clearly present in the apparel and footwear
industry’s evolution from the 1990s to the present day, these pressures are not of primary
concern to the current study. The focus of this study is on the internal adaptations of
pioneering firms, not those mimicking these early adopters.
Normative pressures:
The key theoretical focus for this study, normative pressures can be understood as
those related to institutional theory’s concept of “professionalization”, meaning: “the
collective struggle of members of an occupation … to establish a cognitive base and
legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:152). In this
study, we extend this grouping from the focus on a shared occupation, to the entire
apparel and footwear industry. Of central importance to the concept of
professionalization are formal education and membership in professional networks. This
study will also expand the concept of membership of individuals in professional networks
to membership of whole organizations (focal firms) in external regulatory groups (such as
the FLA).
Importantly, institutional theory states that one mechanism that helps to facilitate
normative pressures is the “filtering of personnel”, or, all professionals coming from
similar backgrounds and having membership in professional networks making the leaders
at the very top “virtually indistinguishable” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:153). This
phenomenon can contribute to homogeneity of thought in which novel or non-traditional
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ideas and/or innovative solutions to complex problems are inhibited. The “filtering of
personnel” is problematic when a firm (much less an entire industry) is faced with a
legitimacy crisis; because top leaders are so similar, they will not tend to generate
innovative problem solving strategies (Østergaard et al. 2011; Torchia et al. 2011).
The filtering of personnel provides a basis for how normative pressures shape
organizations in the same environment to be increasingly similar. Organizational or
industry-level professional norms are reproduced through shared cognitive, cultural and
demographic profiles of key personnel (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This concept can be
extended to consider what conditions would pressure such norms to change. Considering
previous scholarship linking diversity of leadership with changing CSR outcomes for the
better, this project aims to understand whether the normative organizational responses to
the coercive, external forces of the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s—the development of
the voluntary labor regulation system (changed industry norms)—resulted at least in part
from increased diversity among industry leadership (combating the filtering of personnel
phenomenon). While homogeneity among key personnel would inhibit organizational
change and innovation, increased diversity among leaders and decision-makers would
allow for normative shifts in thinking and, potentially, organizational changes aimed at
counter-acting or diffusing external critiques. Additionally, understanding the difference
between firms’ supply chain management efforts that seek to transform and sustain best
practices from those aimed merely at symbolically addressing activist concerns is
paramount to understanding the depth of this normative shift—as well as substantive
issues of labor rights and sustainability.
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Dhanarajan (2005) describes the transition businesses underwent in their social
and environmental responsibility policies from a “deny and defend” position to “paying
penance” through analyzing a study conducted by Oxfam International focused on the
retail sector’s donation and philanthropy practices. By 2005, retail firms in Oxfam’s
study had transitioned into a phase based on risk management. This risk management is
often characterized as those discussed in the coercive forces segment: firms instituting
codes of conduct for their suppliers to follow concerning social and environmental
responsibility, especially acceptable labor practices. Similar to Dhanarajan’s conclusions,
other scholars consider risk management strategies—such as codes of conduct—to be a
step in the right direction but ultimately inadequate. Many scholars conclude that future
efforts of firms need to be supplemented with oversight from regulatory institutions,
implementation of further policies and practices, and further involvement of civil society
organizations (Egel-Zander 2007; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke 2009; Conner & Dent 2006;
Distelhorst et al. 2015).
In summary, the existing norms of the apparel and footwear industry were under
intense scrutiny during the early 1990s by a variety of external stakeholders. It was clear
to corporate leaders during this period that they would need to change their practices, as
evidenced by the proliferation of codes of conduct, risk management programs, and
participation in external regulation, such as that provided by the FLA. However,
institutional theory posits that the “filtering of personnel” among top leaders with similar
backgrounds will stunt firms’ ability to adequately adapt and identify innovative
solutions during times of crisis.
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From this dilemma we discern the focus of this study: did firms pursue internal,
normative changes to counter-act the homogeneity of thought encouraged by the
“filtering of personnel” and did these internal changes enable firms to navigate this crisis
of legitimacy? Previous scholars have failed to analyze the internal mechanisms of
change that initiated and/or implemented these responses. By analyzing the increased
involvement of independent interlocking board members and/or increased race and
gender diversity of BOD membership, this study aims to better understand how and why
these individuals have the documented associations with increased CSR outcomes.
Understanding how and why these board members serve as mechanisms of internal,
normative change could lend insight into their role as change-makers towards more
sustainable organizational policies and practices, and provide a corrective to the
consistent focus on external, coercive pressures to change in the literature today.
Hypothesized Mechanisms
Within the context of the “filtering of personnel”, information sharing and
decision-making among like-minded individuals will not necessarily maximize
innovation. However, institutional theory provides an additional concept that allows for
innovation: the exchange of information among professionals (DiMaggio & Powell
1983). This concept allows for innovation only if individuals come from backgrounds
different from those typically “filtered” to top-level management positions—typically
white males with elite educational backgrounds.
This project utilizes the concept of the exchange of information among
professionals as a mechanism to counteract the homogeneity of thought that comes from
the “filtering of personnel”. This concept is operationalized into two hypothesized
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mechanisms, both of which make the board composition more diverse in nature. Firstly,
this study looks at the appointment of professionals from outside of the firm to focal
firms’ boards. The inclusion of independent board members provides outsiders with
decision making power over firm governance. Further, independent directors that are
interlocked—serving on one or more board(s) in addition to the focal firm’s board—have
been documented as channels of communication and facilitators of information flows
across firms (Mizruchi 1996; Shropshire 2010; Bazerman & Schoorman 1983).
Secondly, this study looks at the appointment of professionals to focal firms’
boards that provide greater board diversity in terms of gender and racial composition.
Previous research has documented an association between the inclusion of more women
and/or racial minority board members and positive corporate policy changes, especially
in regards to better CSR outcomes (Brown et al. 2002; Cook and Glass 2014; Glass et al.
2015; Hillman et al. 2002).
Interlocking Directors:
This study tests whether bringing on an outsider that provides a fresh
perspective—especially one with a unique background different from the majority of the
firms’ top leadership—to the BOD was a strategy used by the founding firms of the FLA
to navigate the legitimacy crisis of the early 1990s. These outsiders are referred to as
independent “interlocks”, and are defined as individual whose primary employment is
external to the company—an independent board member—and serves on multiple boards
of directors—an interlocking director. An interlock is formed when an executive or board
member joins the board of a separate firm, and thus facilitates a connection between the
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two firms (Shropshire 2010; Mizruchi 1996). Interlocks have been identified as
mechanisms for communication across firms (Mizruchi 1996; Shropshire 2010;
Bazerman & Schoorman 1983) as well as mechanisms of reducing environmental
uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Bazerman & Schoorman 1983).
This study’s focus on selecting interlocking directors as an organizational
response during times of uncertainty is informed by previous research, including Hillman
et al. (2000) which found that firms responded to significant changes in environment by
shifting board composition to include more interlocks. More contemporary research has
also pointed to interlocks as mechanisms of change, establishing a quantitative
association between interlocking directors and positive social responsibility outcomes,
especially related to environmental responsibility issues (Glass et al. 2015; Ortiz-deMandojana et al. 2012). Additionally, Webb (2004) found that socially responsible firms
have more characteristics associated with effective board structures, with one of those
effective board structures being the inclusion of more interlocking board directors.
Hypothesis 1: Apparel firms that have sustained their commitment to voluntary labor
monitoring over time will be more likely than other firms to appoint interlocking
directors to their boards between 1996 and 2014.

Director Diversity:
In addition to interlocked directors, board diversity has also been documented as a
mechanism for organizational change. Women and racial/ethnic minorities bring
perspectives and priorities to boards that otherwise are not present due to the “filtering of
personnel”. Women and minorities affect companies because they bring different
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perspectives—thus disrupting issues stemming from homogeneity of thought. Evidence
of the limitations of filtered personnel for innovation risk management is provided by
Brown et al. (2002). They found that firms with boards that included three or more
women were significantly more likely to implement a code of conduct compared firms
with all-male boards.
Additionally, in their study of the relationship of racial/ethnic board diversity and
equity initiatives, Cook and Glass (2014) found that a higher percent of minorities on the
BOD was significantly related to better social and environmental practices. Further, a
study by Glass et al. (2015) found gender diverse leadership teams to be more effective
than their less diverse counterparts in pursuing environmentally friendly strategies. As
these examples illustrate, when a company brings on more women and/or ethnic/racial
minority directors, there are documented positive changes to social and environmental
policies and practices. Non-traditional directors, female and/or racial minority board
members, have been found to have differences of background important for counteracting the impacts of the “filtering of personnel”. For example, Hillman et al. (2002)
found that female and racial minority board directors differ from white males in
education, occupational background, and even in patterns of board affiliation.
Hypothesis 2: Apparel firms that have sustained their commitment to voluntary labor
monitoring over time will be more likely than other firms to appoint women and
racial/ethnic minority directors to their boards between 1996 and 2014.
To answer the research questions, this study employs a deductive/ explanatory
trend analysis to better understand the role independent interlocking and/or more women
and racial minority directors might have played in helping this global industry navigate
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this legitimacy crisis since the 1990s. Results from the trend analysis will determine
whether including independent interlocking directors and/or women and racial minority
directors was a strategy these leading focal firms used in navigating this crisis. These
trends might highlight divergent patterns in directors’ backgrounds between firms that
were more dedicated to changing their global labor governance practices over time versus
those whose commitment was of a more symbolic nature.
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METHODS
Research Design
This project conducts a deductive/explanatory trend analysis to determine if firms
that are most committed to voluntary regulation did in fact recruit more independent
interlocks and/or female and racial minority directors between the years of 1996 to 2014
than firms that are least committed (as theory and previous empirical studies suggests
they will have). Further analysis will determine the average tenure of all directors and
compare this with average tenure for independent interlocks, in order to determine
whether or not these directors were added recently (short tenures) or were existing board
members that just took on additional board memberships over this period. While all
components analyzed—gender, race, tenure, independent status, and interlocking status—
is included in individual’s professional biographies, information for both hypotheses was
compiled into the same author-constructed dataset.
Sampling
The ten focal firms selected are the firms of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) that
were members by the first operational year (2001) and remained with the FLA through at
least 2005, if not longer. This sample was selected because the formation of the FLA was
the first initiative to regulate global labor governance practices of apparel and footwear
brands that firms voluntarily consented to participate in (Fair Labor Association 2016). It
was started in close conjunction with Nike, the highest valued apparel brand of 2015
(Friedman 2015) and the frequent focus of supply chain management studies looking at
global labor governance (Conner & Dent 2006; Distelhorst et al. 2015a; Distelhorst et al.
2015b; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke et al. 2007b).
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Several academic studies and news articles have included the FLA (and Nike,
specifically) as integral components in the private regulation of global labor governance
(Guthrie 2012; Locke et al. 2007b; Distelhorst et al. 2015b). Locke et al. (2007b) explain
that these monitoring practices are “currently the principal way both global corporations
and labor rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address poor working
conditions in global supply chain factories” (3).
Further criteria for gauging firms’ commitment to the external, private regulation
of global labor governance will be operationalized through membership in a similar
organization, the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), founded in 2010. Specific points
of commitment are outlined in the figure below, and constitute important benchmarks in
the development of firms’ responses to the labor governance legitimacy crisis in the
short, medium, and long terms. These points include meeting with President Clinton in
1996 regarding the Fair Labor Coalition initiative/formation of the AIP, being a member
of the FLA by the first operational year (2001), being a founding member of the SAC
(2010), being a current member of the FLA (2016), and/or being a current member of the
SAC (2016). An overview of the sampling results for each firm is located in Table 1.
Although there were an additional 5 firms that were early members of the AIP
and/or the FLA, the sample only included firms that transitioned from the short into the
medium term, so that “symbolic” versus “sustainable” commitments could be
determined. Additionally, two firms that met the criteria were ultimately excluded due to
data limitations—Patagonia and Zephyr Graf X. Both of these companies are private and
are therefore not required by the SEC to report their board membership information.

24
Data Collection
I compiled the data into an author-constructed dataset of all directors that served
on BODs of the focal firms between 1996 and 2014. Overall, there were 131 BOD lists
and 199 individual directors. Initial data collection came from the Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS) database, which collects a range of variables related to board
directors from S&P 1500 companies, and has BOD information beginning with this
project’s starting point of 1996, and with the most recent data available being 2014.
WRDS data was available for 5 of the 8 firms including: Nike, PVH, Nordstrom, Liz
Claiborne, and Polo Ralph Lauren. Variables provided by WRDS that are relevant to this
study include: name, age, gender, board affiliation (employee of firm or independent),
primary company name, and number of other public company boards serving on (number
of interlocks).
Information not available from WRDS included the names of any interlocking
firms, tenure as a board member (available only for more recent years), as well as
educational background. I collected information unavailable through WRDS—as well as
for provided information that was incomplete or conflicting—from official corporate
websites and documents published online, such as PDFs of firms’ Annual Reports to
Shareholders and documentation on the SEC’s “Edgar” (Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval System) database, such as the 10-K Annual Report forms.
Ultimately, data on interlocking directors was very limited from WRDS and so I pulled
that information from additional sources for all 199 directors.
For firms that were not on the S&P 1500 companies lists, and therefore not
included in the WRDS database (i.e. Adidas, Reebok and Eddie Bauer), I pulled board

25
membership lists from PDFs of firms’ 10-K Annual Report forms available online from
the SEC’s “Edgar” database. Overall, I pulled 65% of director lists from WRDS, and
35% from 10-K filings. A complete inventory of whether each firms’ director lists for
each year came from the WRDS database or from Annual Report documents is found
below in Table 2.
Measurement
Operationalization:
The number of interlocking directorships, and names of those firms, was recorded
for each independent director for every year between 1996 and 2014, with numbers often
changing throughout one director’s entries. For example, an independent director may be
on a focal firm’s board for the entire 1996-2014 period and throughout that 19-year
period hold various additional directorships. Directors were counted as an “interlock” for
each year they served on one or more additional boards outside of their membership on
the focal firm’s board. For example, if a director served on three additional boards
between 1996 and 2000, two between 2001 and 2007, and no additional boards between
2008 and 2014, this hypothetical director would be counted as one interlock for each of
the 12 years between 1996 and 2014 that she served. Meaning that only interlock status
was counted, not the actual number of board interlocks (which in this example would be
29).
Director gender was determined first by any available WRDS data. If the data for
a given director for a given year was incomplete, then gender was determined from
information provided in professional biographies including name, photos, and use of
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gender-specific pronouns. Director race/ethnicity was determined in a similar fashion. If
WRDS data was unavailable, listed as “unknown” or had conflicting information—
differing racial categories for different years (such as “Hispanic” in 1997 and then
“Asian” in 2002) — information provided in professional biographies was also consulted.
Race/ethnicity was preliminarily surmised from professional photos. Further research was
done to confirm (when possible) the individual director’s association with ethnically
identifying organizations—such as the Black Business Association or the National
Hispanic Business Group.
Reliability/Validity:
For the validity of the racial/ethnic identification of directors, multiple steps were
taken to confirm the accuracy of a director’s classification. In terms of the reliability of
racial/ethnic classifications, the accompanying chart (found below in Table 3) shows how
many directors for each company were determined by the author, with approximately
23% of all race/ethnicity entries being determined by the author.
Gender classifications for directors were readily available for the five firms
included in the WRDS data (Nike, PVH, Nordstrom, Liz Claiborne, and Polo Ralph
Lauren). Less than 10% of each of these firms’ entries had an “unknown” gender listed
and none of them had conflicting genders listed in different entries for the same director.
For the firms not included in the WRDS data, gender was clearly identifiable from
biographical information including name, photos, and use of gender-specific pronouns.
Additionally, to ensure inter-coder reliability, a random sample of a third (33%)
of all directors for which the author determined the race/ethnicity classification (31 of the

27
93 author determined directors) were sent to a colleague. The reviewer was also asked to
identify the directors’ gender. Both race/ethnicity and gender classifications were
confirmed by the reviewer with full accuracy: 100% matches in both categories for all 31.
Despite the inclusion of the “Interlocking Directorship” variable by WRDS, data
for independent interlock status pulled from WRDS was extremely limited. This was due
to: (1) a majority of initial lists being incomplete or inaccurate—almost completely filled
with “0” for all firms for all years; and (2) interlock status was indicated in WRDS data
for directors of both board affiliation statuses: both independent and employees.
Therefore, independent interlock status was determined by the author for each director
included in the dataset (a total of 199 individuals). All directors’ biographical information
was sourced from company websites, official documents filed with the SEC and available
online, and/or from websites including Bloomberg and Forbes. The names of the firms
where directors were independent interlocks were also collected for each year.
Data Analysis
Once data collection was completed, a trend analysis was conducted. The three
primary trend analyses included: 1) number of female directors per year for each focal
firm 2) number of ethnic/racial minority directors per year for each focal firm and 3)
number of independent interlocks per year for each focal firm. Trends were compared for
each of these variables between firms with shorter commitments to labor regulation and
those with the longer, more sustainable commitments to voluntary regulation of labor
governance in global production facilities.
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FINDINGS
My hypotheses examine two primary questions: whether apparel firms that have
sustained their commitment to voluntary labor monitoring between 1996 and 2014 will be
more likely than other firms to, firstly, appoint independent interlocking directors to their
boards and, secondly, appoint women and racial/ethnic minority directors to their boards.
All firms increased the number of women and racial minority directors over this period,
however, least committed firms actually had the most in both categories over the entire
period. Additionally, trends in the number of independent interlocking directors varied
quite widely across firm groups within this time period.
Interlocks
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with sustained commitments to voluntary labor
monitoring will have been more likely to appoint independent interlocking directors to
their boards. Results do not support this hypothesis. Firms that were least committed to
voluntary labor monitoring were found to have a higher percentage of independent
interlocking directors than more committed firms for all years from the beginning in 1996
through the end of the period in 2014. However, least committed firms were the only
group that decreased the overall number of independent interlocks over this period; they
maintained a higher number than most committed firms merely by started out with
significantly more independent interlocking directors in 1996. More committed firms had
a steady increase across the entire period from 19.3% up to 38.7%. Least committed
firms started much higher at 51%, decreased through the short and medium terms, and
then leveled off in the most recent period to end at 43%. Thus, the gap between the most
and least committed firms significantly converged from a 31.7% difference in the
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baseline period (1996-2000) to a difference of only 4.3% in the most recent period (20102014) (refer to Figure 2).
Bankrupt, Acquired, and Split Firms:
A finding of surprising strength came from the category of firms that either went
bankrupt (Eddie Bauer), were acquired (Reebok), or split into separate firms (Liz
Claiborne). Collectively, these firms saw an average increase of nearly 60% between
1996 and 2009: with average independent interlocking director percentages rising from
22.70% to 82% over this period (refer to Figures 5 and 6). This rise was much sharper
than that of the most and least committed category groups, indicating that recruiting
independent interlocking directors served a function during times of other firm crisis as
well outside of the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s. Suggestions for further research in this
area are discussed in the conclusion segment of this study.
Gender and Racial Diversity
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with sustained commitments to voluntary labor
monitoring will have been more likely to appoint women and racial/ethnic minority
directors to their boards. Results do not support this hypothesis, while least committed
firms had higher percentages of women as well as racial minorities on their boards for all
years between 1996 and 2014.
Gender:
The percentage of female board membership increased for all groups over the
1996 to 2014 time period. With firm groups having averages between 8.5% and 15% in
the baseline period (1996-2000), firm groups ended with averages between 13.7% and
23.5% in the final period (2010-2014) (refer to Figure 5).
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Race:
The percentage of racial minority board membership increased for all groups over
the 1996 to 2014 time period. With firm groups having averages between 8.5% and 15%
in the baseline period (1996-2000), firm groups ended with averages between 13.7% and
23.5% in the final period (2010-2014) (refer to Figure 6).
Gender and Racial Similarities:
In the first transition period, between 1996-2000 and 2001-2005, trends in gender
and racial minority board membership were the same: most committed firms actually
decreased their percentages of female and racial minority board memberships, while least
committed firms increased both of these categories. In the next transition period, between
2001-2005 and 2006-2009, both least and most committed groups increased their
percentage female BOD membership, while the most committed group increased and the
least committed group decreased racial minority membership—thus decreasing the gap
created in the initial period. In the final transition period, 2006-2009 to 2010-2014,
female membership converged slightly, ending with a difference of ~10% (least
committed firms with 23.5% and most committed firms with 13.7%) and an almost full
convergence in the racial minority membership leaving only a 1% gap, between 15.70%
(most committed) and 16.5% (least committed) (refer to Figure 3).
Additionally, the least committed firm group had the most variance in both
percentage of female board membership—18.5%—and percentage of racial minority
board membership—15%. The racial minority percentage increase of 15% took place
between the baseline and short term years, and was an increase of 276%—almost tripling
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the original percentage from 8.5% to 23.5%. The group comprised of firms that were
bankrupt, acquired, or split into multiple brands had the least amount of variance, with
3% variance in female board membership and 2% variance in racial minority board
membership (refer to Figure 7).
Lastly, there was a very large contrast between US-based firms and the 2 foreignbased firms: Eddie Bauer and Adidas (both of which are German). The two Germanowned firms had the two lowest percentages of female and racial minority board
membership. Adidas had 0% female or racial minority board members for all years, while
Eddie Bauer had 0% racial minorities for all years and 0% (1996-2000), 6% (2001-2005),
and 11% (2006-2009) female board membership.
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DISCUSSION
This study developed a theoretical framework rooted in institutional theory to
frame the actions of firms in times of crisis—in this instance, during a legitimacy crisis
stemming from highly publicized labor abuses in foreign production facilities. In
considering the different pressures firms face from an institutional theory perspective,
internal changes to corporate governance represent normative change, while membership
in voluntary regulatory groups (such as the FLA) represent a coerced change. The
relationship between normative changes to firms’ BODs and commitment to changes
brought about by coercive forces (commitment to voluntary regulatory organizations)
were analyzed. While much scholarship has already established the relationship between
increased diversity of boards through the addition of women and racial minorities and the
inclusion of independent interlocks, these internal, normative changes—represented in
this study by changes to firms’ BOD composition—are the focal point of this study as
they have not previously been considered by scholars or activists as a mechanism of
change towards more humane and sustainable labor practices.
My findings suggest that firms in both the least and most committed groups
pursued a strategy to appoint more female directors and more directors of racial minority
background to their boards over the period of 1996 to 2014. However, the group of firms
least committed to voluntary labor regulation had the highest percentages of both female
and racial minority board members over this entire period, contrary to the hypothesized
relationship of the most committed firms having the highest amounts of female and racial
minority board members. Similarly, firms that were least committed to voluntary labor
monitoring had a higher percentage of independent interlocking directors than more
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committed firms from the beginning in 1996 through the end of the period in 2014. Yet,
least committed firms were the only group to decrease their overall percentage of
independent interlocking directors over the 1996 to 2014 period. Both most committed
firms and firms that went bankrupt, were acquired, or split increased their percentages of
independent interlocking board members over this period.
Implications for Theory
This article adds to the understanding of mechanisms that drive organizational
change in times of crisis by analyzing the internal, normative mechanisms that shaped the
responses of focal firms during their legitimacy crisis of the 1990’s. It also adds to
research on board of director composition through analyzing the conditions in which
firms seek out certain board members, including more diverse members and/or
independent interlocking board members.

Separate Strategies
This study intended to synthesize the research on board diversity and interlocks,
by testing them as similar strategies for firms to deal with an environment of uncertainty.
However, despite the gender and racial minority data having similar overall trends, these
trends were very different from those of independent interlocking board members. This
finding extends current understanding in two ways. Firstly, it sheds more light on
mechanisms that drive organizational change by illustrating that firms view the internal,
normative changes of including more directors that promote board diversity—more
women and racial minorities—as a very different strategy than including more
independent interlocking directors on the board. Secondly, it extends research on board
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composition by finding separate reactions to these two board member types by focal
firms experiencing a common crisis. Especially when paired with the extreme increase of
independent interlocks over time by firms in the bankruptcy, acquisition and split group,
these findings provide further insight into what types of external mechanisms (such as a
legitimacy crisis or other times of crises), motivate firms to seek more diverse boards
and/or more interlocking board members.
Symbolic vs Sustainable
This project also extends knowledge of organizational change by analyzing the
different internal normative mechanisms (increased board diversity and increased
interlocking board memberships) that shaped firms’ responses to external pressures
(maintaining their commitment to voluntary regulation or not). Despite findings being
overall consistent with the theoretical premise that firms would increase the amount of
women and racial minorities on boards, as well as increase the number of independent
interlocks in response to this time of crisis, the fact that the results find the group of firms
least committed to voluntary labor regulation as having the highest percentages directors
in each of these categories over this entire period has important theoretical implications.
This finding indicates support for the argument that firms have made symbolic
changes to their internal practices that do not translate into meaningful and sustainable
changes in labor governance in global supply chains. This increased inclusion of racial
minorities and women, as well as independent interlocks, could represent a symbolic
gesture in the area of firm governance, mirroring symbolic changes and commitments to
bettering labor conditions abroad illustrated by previous scholars. These new board
memberships that add to board diversity could be symbolic in nature, with new members
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not participating in any meaningful way or contributing any meaningful normative
changes.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The regulation of major firms’ global labor practices has been a contentious issue
for more than twenty years, and both scholars and labor activist groups are still critical of
the voluntary compliance model for regulating global labor practices in the present day.
When considering options for changing the system of voluntary regulation, most scholars
and activists have focused on external pressures to coerce firms to change. Although this
study is focused on the internal, normative mechanisms to promote better labor
governance outcomes, some of the key arguments posed by scholars and activists calling
for coercive pressure to steer firms away from harmful labor practices and towards more
humane and sustainable ones are outlined in the following segments.

Central Critiques of Voluntary Regulation
Criticisms of voluntary regulation of labor practices posed by scholars and
activists in the late 1990’s centered around a few major areas ignored by the AIP/FLA
agreements. The major points of contention were that the AIP/FLA code of conduct
agreement did not include a living wage provision and also had poorly-ensured
enforcement for freedom of association and collective bargaining of works (Hemphill
1999). Secondly, the monitoring procedures put forth by the FLA to enforce this code of
conduct were criticized for two main reasons. Firstly, the extent to which the external
monitoring was truly “independent” was questioned, while member firms are allowed to
choose who will perform the monitoring and which factories will be monitored (Hemphill
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1999). Secondly, union officials questioned the low percentage of eligible manufacturing
sites to be sampled annually, and stated that it should be much higher (Hemphill 1999).
Corporate Control over Voluntary Regulation
Ironic to the focus of this study, the legitimacy of the FLA is also questioned by
many in large part due to the governance nature of the FLA’s board of directors. The
FLA’s board always has enough corporate members for them to outweigh representatives
from labor rights groups and to hold the super majority the FLA requires for key decision
making (United Students Against Sweatshops 2016). Critics argue that due to this
unbalanced relationship between activists and corporate interests, the FLA is beholden to
corporate members (United Students Against Sweatshops 2016). Additionally, the FLA
does not have any union representation; the only union ever to be a part of FLA (UNITE)
resigned in 2003, just two years into the FLA being operation (Hemphill 1999). Critics
further argue that the FLA does not provide any meaningful role for workers, while they
only perform on-site interviews which allow for worker intimidation (United Students
Against Sweatshops 2016). Lastly, critics question the transparency of the FLA, because
they do not provide the actual names of factories they monitor (they provide reports with
general location areas rather than by identifying factory names) which makes it hard for
other groups to confirm or deny their findings (United Students Against Sweatshops
2016).
Voluntary Regulation as an External Function
Perhaps the most salient criticism of the private regulation model of organizations
like the FLA suggested by scholars is that it separates the labor regulation into an
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external function, rather than integrating it into core business functions. The result is a
focus on risk management and compliance rather than a genuine commitment to
sustainability. This critique has been echoed by several scholars: Kytle and Ruggie
(2005) suggest linking CSR efforts with core business functions to reap full benefits;
Dhanarajan (2005) seconds this concern by arguing that companies need to forge
“connectivity and coherence” between their core business operations and their ethical and
environmental commitments for those commitments to become sustainable. Further,
Seuring and Mueller (2008) consider this distinction to be between “supplier
management for risk and performance” (decoupled) and “supply chain management for
sustainable production” (integrated). Barrientos and Smith (2007) deem the decoupled
approach the “corporate approach”, focused on compliance and outcome standards, and
the integrated approach the “civil society approach”, focused on process rights for
workers.
The importance of compliance and risk management programs being decoupled
from or integrated into core business processes cannot be understated. MacLean and
Behnam (2010) explain the “dangers of decoupling” in their study looking at an extreme
case of deceptive sales practices occurring within a large financial services firm. At
worst, compliance/risk management programs decoupled from core business practices
can be of a purely symbolic nature, characterized by MacLean and Behnam (2010) as a
“legitimacy façade”, enabling the company to conduct itself in an unethical manner,
without the threat of losing its external legitimacy.
Mechanisms of Change
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Scholars and activists alike are very critical of the existing voluntary compliance
model for regulating global labor practices that has been the FLA’s legacy. However, in
considering possible ways to change corporate practices, scholars and activists tend to
focus on coercive measures of external control. This study’s findings also have important
implications for public policy as well as corporate practices. By increasing understanding
of how and why increased board diversity serves as a mechanism of internal, normative
change—this study provides further insight into these board members’ role as change
makers towards more sustainable organizational policies and practices related to labor
governance and other important issues aside from coercive alternatives imposed on these
organizations from outside.

39
CONCLUSION
In studying the apparel industry’s response to the legitimacy crisis, and
subsequent formation of the FLA, this project was limited by a number of inherent
factors. Firstly, it provided a rather narrow sample size. Although there were fifteen firms
associated with the formation of the FLA in some way before 2001, only eight of these
firms continued with the FLA into at least the second (“short term”) time period of 2005.
These eight firms were further divided down into sub-categories of being most and least
committed, and then the additional third category of bankrupt, acquired, or split. Thus,
each group only had 2-3 member firms. Data was also limited by the inclusion of
information from the 1990’s, which is less readily available, as well as from foreign
firms—Eddie Bauer and Adidas. While other countries do not have the same reporting
requirements as the United States, data was especially difficult to acquire for these two
firms. Finally, data was constrained to beginning in 1996 and ending in 2014, rather than
2015, because that is the most recent data available from Wharton’s WRDS database that
was utilized.
In addition to sample size and data availability issues, this project also used
membership in voluntary labor regulation organizations as an indicator of commitment to
bettering labor conditions in global supply chains. Although this was done out of
necessity to analyze firm’s reactions to the legitimacy crisis of the 1990’s—creating and
joining these organizations was their collective response—scholars and labor activists
have posed numerous, salient criticisms questioning the efficacy of these organizations.
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Future research could expand this study in a few different directions. Researchers
could replication and expand the trend analysis this study utilizes by conducting an
additional explorative analysis looking for trends in directors’ background information,
including professional history and educational history. In addition to the Board of
Directors composition, future scholars should consider the changing composition of
senior executive leadership teams as a possible normative mechanism and their impact on
sustainability outcomes.
Additionally, Scholars could conduct qualitative interviews with firm decision
makers and ask about how and why gender and racial minority board memberships are
thought about differently than independent interlocking board memberships. Qualitative
interviews would also provide an opportunity to inquire about the activity of these
different types of board members—asking about how frequently female and racial
minority board members attend board meetings, vote on important issues, and/or generate
unique policy suggestions in comparison to white male board members as well as
independent interlocking board members. Scholars could further investigate the relative
level of influence each of these director types have on sustainability outcomes, such as
labor governance decisions.
Lastly, scholars could further explore the relationship between independent
interlocking board members and other types of firm crises. As evidenced by this study’s
findings, the firms experiencing bankruptcy, mergers, and splitting off into multiple
brands had extremely high numbers of independent interlocking board members over
these periods of crises.
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